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The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of
fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them.
In this paper, we put forward rational robustness, a new solution concept/implementation notion that is
not equilibrium-based; prove its fundamental structural theorems; and compare it with prior notions.
Our notion of implementation is specifically built so as to be robust against the problem of equilibrium
selection. We prove it robust against other fundamental problems as well in different papers.
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1 Introduction
1.1 A Conceptual Contribution
The primary contribution of this paper is conceptual: we introduce new notions for mechanism design and
establish their fundamental structural properties. Conceptual contributions are harder to evaluate than
technical ones. After all, a technical advancement is by definition immediately measurable, whether or not it
will be superseded in a few months. The value of a new notion is instead best measured over several years. So
it is understandable that, despite all claims to the contrary, conferences (including FOCS and STOC) might
treat new notions with some skepticism. Yet, the risk of encouraging new notions for mechanism design is
worth taking.
Traditionally based on equilibria, mechanism design is a beautiful and successful field, see in particular
[9, 13, 14, 15, 11, 16], but needs a new conceptual platform in order to be robust against collusion, computa-
tion/communication complexity, and privacy. Collusion is a problem for traditional mechanisms because an
equilibrium only guarantees that no individual player has any incentive to deviate from his envisaged strat-
egy. But two or more players may have plenty of incentive to jointly deviate from their envisaged strategies,
which is exactly what collusive players do. Complexity is a problem because traditional mechanisms often
are too hard to play (because the players must act over exponentially many rounds or communicate expo-
nentially many bits, or because —after the players are done playing— the outcome functions are too hard
to evaluate). In practice this problem would imply that no one could live long enough to see the outcomes
of such mechanisms. Moreover, it may not be solved by adopting some computationally tractable variants,
because these may fail to be “incentive compatible” or sufficiently close approximations. Privacy is a problem
in traditional mechanisms because the players are routinely asked to reveal their own utility functions. But,
by so doing, privacy-valuing players will by definition receive a negative utility, thus putting into serious
question the overall incentive compatibility of such mechanisms. Game theory, of which mechanism design is
a major part, aims at building a science of human strategic behavior. And in the world as it is, rather than
as it should be, humans collude, have bounded computation/communication resources, and care a lot about
privacy. By ignoring these uniquely human truths, mechanism design cannot be sufficiently robust, and can
actually fail to reach its ultimate research goals, or severely limit the extent to which it achieves them.
To be sure, there have been efforts to improve the robustness of various mechanisms against one or more
of collusion, complexity, or privacy. But there is no effort underway to rebuild mechanism design from its
foundations so as to demand and achieve reasonable robustness, in all these three fronts, from any mechanism.
In our opinion, the quest of robust mechanisms will be ultimately frustrated by the currently prevailing
insistence on equilibria as the main, underlying solution concept. This solution concept has served us well so
far, but new ones are needed to underwrite the design of robust mechanisms. Providing and studying such
a candidate new solution concept is the very goal of this paper.
Coherently with what just said we put forward a solution concept that is not equilibrium-based, because it
typically demands mechanisms to guarantee their desired properties also at profiles of strategies that are not
equilibria. Only occasionally, our concept coincides with more traditional ones: such as the single equilibrium
surviving the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, or, in extensive-form games, the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Although applicable to normal-form games, where all players act once and
simultaneously, our solution concept achieves its full power for games of extensive form, where the players
act over several turns. We find this phenomenon quite natural for two reasons. First, because we want to
define a rational play in a more stringent way than in a Nash equilibrium, and thus sequential mechanisms
give us a “finer control on the players’ rationality.” (For instance, “empty threats” can be easily dismissed
in extensive-form games, but not in their normal-form counterparts.) Second, because we want to preserve
the players’ privacy as much as possible, and thus interaction becomes crucial. (For instance, proofs can
be zero-knowledge if prover and verifier talk back and forth [7], but no zero-knowledge proofs exist if the
prover must communicate his proofs in a single message —unless additional infrastructure such as public and
random string is available [2].)
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Technically, our solution concept is based on a more elementary notion, iterative elimination of dis-
tinguishably dominated strategies, which may itself be of independent interest. In fact, it bridges a
currently vast chasm: that between elimination of strictly dominated strategies (a procedure very meaning-
ful, but unlikely to provide the foundation of many extensive-form mechanisms) and elimination of weakly
dominated strategies (a procedure very general, but unlike to be sufficiently meaningful for providing a solid
foundation for any mechanism).
We have been able to design a few mechanisms provably robust against collusion, complexity, and privacy
[4, 3, 5]. But to enable the design of many more robust mechanisms, mechanism design needs a new,
meaningful, and general solution concept. This paper is thus fully dedicated to this goal.
Our present notion actually is a strict generalization of those used in our previous robustness results.
1.2 The Problems of Equilibrium Selection and Players’ Beliefs
Short of taking our word, it might not be immediately clear that our new notion of implementation will usher
in mechanisms robust against collusion, complexity and privacy. (Although it might be reasonable to hope
that non equilibrium-based mechanism design will succeed where equilibrium-based mechanism design failed.)
But it should be obvious that our solution concept addresses directly a more basic problem in traditional
mechanism design: equilibrium selection.
The Lethality of Equilibrium Selection Mechanism design aims at achieving a desired property P
by leveraging the players’ rationality. Traditional mechanism design interprets this goal as achieving P “at
equilibrium.” That is, it aims at engineering a game G with an equilibrium σ whose play yields an outcome
for which P holds. Recall that an equilibrium σ is a profile of strategies, one for each player, such that each
σi is player i’s best strategy to play if he believes that each other player j will choose strategy σj . Since
equilibria are regarded as predictions of how rational players will play, traditional mechanism design provides
a rational hope that P will hold in the actual play of G. But this hope is not a guarantee. Typical games,
including engineered ones, have multiple equilibria, and if P holds at some of them, it may not hold at others.
Accordingly, a more demanding notion of mechanism design has been considered, full implementation
(at equilibria), whose engineered games must be such that their desired properties hold at each of their
possible equilibria. Full implementation too, however, can be astronomically far from guaranteeing a desired
property P . Let us explain. Assume that the game G is of normal form. This means that all players act
only once, choosing their strategies without any interaction with the other players. (In essence, each player
can be thought as choosing his strategy in a separate room.) All games can be put in this form, and the
overwhelming majority of the games arising in mechanism design are of this form. Assume now that G has
just two equilibria, σ and τ , such that σi 6= τi for each player i. Then, two different predictions are equally
rational about what each player i will do in his own room: (1) he will select strategy σi, and (2) he will select
strategy τi. But since all players act independently, this also implies that it is rational to envisage that 2n
different plays of G can actually arise! Thus, if P holds at just two of them, namely the equilibria σ and τ ,
hoping that P will hold in an actual play of G has much more to do with miracles than with rationality.
The Fatal Attraction of Beliefs Equilibrium selection arises because the very general notion of an
equilibrium is based on the player’s beliefs (about what the others will do), but players’ beliefs may not
“properly match.” Reliance on players’ beliefs is as convenient as it is artificial and dangerous. On one hand,
it guarantees that every finite game has an equilibrium, the famous Nash theorem. On the other, it causes
equilibrium selection to be not an exogenous and occasional nuisance, but an intrinsic and ever present
problem for equilibrium-based mechanism design.
As we shall soon see, reliance on players’ beliefs will further tempt us —in new ways— to trade mean-
ingfulness for convenience, and we will have to work harder to reject the offer.
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Mechanism Design Free of Equilibrium Selection The problem of equilibrium selection totally van-
ishes when a mechanism yields a game with a (single) equilibrium in which each strategy (1) is strictly
dominant or (2) survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Unfortunately, the applicabil-
ity of both types of mechanisms is limited.
Strictly dominant-strategy mechanisms are very rare (and provably cannot achieve many desired proper-
ties —e.g., [6, 18]). Accordingly, forcing designers to consider only such mechanisms would confine mechanism
design to the catching of white elephants.
Mechanisms of the second type have been shown by Abreu and Matsushima [1] to be capable of essentially
achieving all desired properties, but under very strong assumptions. In essence, ignoring other technical
conditions, their general mechanism assumes that each player perfectly knows the utility functions of all
players. This of course is a significant restriction and cannot be easily removed. In fact, iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies is not even defined unless all players’ utilities are common knowledge (at
least in a non-Bayesian setting). Yet, even under such strong assumptions, their mechanism, as well as the
extensive-form variant of Glazer and Perry [8], can be proved to be vulnerable to collusion, complexity, and
privacy in intrinsic ways.
(Note that equilibrium selection continues to affect, although to a lesser extent, the notions of implemen-
tation in weakly dominant strategies, and implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium [12].)
In sum, to enable mechanism design to cast a wide and robust net, new and “belief-independent” notions
of implementations should be sought.
1.3 Our Notion of Implementation
Mechanism design must be based on an underlying solution concept. Indeed, one must first define rational
plays and then ensure that a given property P holds at the rational plays of his engineered game. The
weakness of Nash equilibria as a solution concept is not being “closed under Cartesian product”, which we
have argued to be at the root of the problem of equilibrium selection. To eradicate this problem at its root, (1)
we consider only solution concepts consisting of a profile S of strategy subsets —rather than a set of strategy
profiles— and (2) we demand that a mechanism guarantees its desired property for any play σ ∈ S1× · · ·Sn.
But:
How should such strategy subsets Si be chosen?
We break our answer in several stages.
Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies Assume initially that (1) each player per-
fectly knows everyone’s utilities, and (2) the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies (see [17])
leaves each player i with a single strategy σi. In this wonderful case, we chose Si = {σi} for each player i.
This choice provides a perfectly rational answer to the above question, and indeed is the very implementation
notion of the cited mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima [1].
Implementation in Surviving Strategies Let us now keep the first assumption above, but remove the
second one. That is, let us assume that, after the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, each
player i is left with a subset Li of surviving strategies. Then we choose Si = Li for each i. By this choice,
we demand that our desired property P holds for any strategy profile of surviving strategies, and thus refer
to the corresponding notion of implementation as implementation in surviving strategies. Note that such an
implementation already is not equilibrium-based, because —as for implementation in undominated strategies
[10]— a profile of surviving strategies needs not to be an equilibrium at all.
Rationally Robust Implementation Still keeping for now the assumption of perfectly knowledgeable
players, we want to eliminate strategies a bit more aggressively. One obvious temptation would be to adopt
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iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, but such a solution concept would be ill-defined. This is
so because the final subsets of surviving strategies would be crucially dependent on the order in which the
players choose to eliminate their strategies. Thus, if different players used different orders of elimination, a
mechanism’s desired property P might not be guaranteed at all, even if it held whenever all players eliminate
strategies in the same order. To overcome this obstacle, it is tempting to rely upon a different type of beliefs:
beliefs about elimination orderings. But we reject this easy temptation. No matter what beliefs the players
might have (about playing, elimination ordering, or anything else), even if these beliefs happened to be
miraculously and properly matched, assuming that a mechanism designer might be aware of them strikes us
as totally artificial.
Accordingly, we instead consider a new elimination process, iterative elimination of distinguishably domi-
nated strategies. Distinguishable domination is “in between” strict and weak domination (but coincides with
strict domination for normal-form games). While the precise description of our elimination process P is
better left to our technical sections, we wish to highlight here its intuitive properties. Namely,
0. Order Independence. Even if every player uses his own order of strategy elimination, the final strategy
subset of each player is unique (up to “isomorphism”).
1. Perspective Independence. If i eliminates (in his mind) a strategy σj of an opponent j, then a rational
j will never play σj .
(Thus, it is safe for i to further eliminate one of his own strategies σi based on his own elimination
of σj , in the sense that he will never be “surprised” by j using σj against him in a real play.)
2. Belief Independence. After each player ends his own execution of P, our desired property must hold for
any play σ (not necessarily an equilibrium!) in the Cartesian product of the sets of surviving strategies.
Note that we do not demand that such a process P produces a profile of minimal strategy subsets for which
the above three properties hold.1 Indeed, as we are also eager to deal with mechanisms that do not rely on
fully rational players, we find it important to consider also processes P that yield strategy subsets “barely”
satisfying the above three properties.

Summary of Rationally Robust Implementation for Perfect-Knowledge, Independent Settings
• For normal-form games, rationally robust implementation coincides with implementation in surviving
strategies, and thus with implementation in iteratively undominated strategies in the best case; and
• For extensive-form games, rationally robust implementation is different from implementation in sur-
viving strategies and is stronger than backward induction, but coincides with unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium in the best case.
By strictly generalizing these classical and very meaningful notions, rationally robust implementation aims at
providing meaningful flexibility, that is, at enabling designers to construct mechanisms achieving new desired
properties —such as robustness against collusion, complexity, and privacy— or achieving older properties in
more practical ways.

Dealing with Imperfect Knowledge It is now time for us to remove the unrealistic assumption that
the players have perfect knowledge of each other’s utility functions, without introducing other debatable
assumptions such as the availability of Bayesian information. But then, even the iterative elimination of
distinguishably dominated strategies becomes ill-defined. Thus, we must extend our notion of implementation
to the case of imperfectly knowledgeable players. To this end, we define what strategies the players can
iteratively and safely eliminate, not only based on the common knowledge of rationality, but also on whatever
knowledge each player may have about the utility functions of his opponents.
1For instance, if the iterated elimination of all strictly dominated strategies whose binary representation starts with 0 satisfied
mechanism usefulness, we would be satisfied.
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Dealing with Collusion Finally, we enlarge our implementation notion (and thus its underlying notion
of an iterative elimination) to settings where different players belong to different collusive sets, and a player
may not have any knowledge about these collusive sets (except his own, if he is a colluder).
Road Map We first present our notion of implementation in the simpler setting in which each player is
(1) independent (i.e., does not collude with anyone else) and (2) perfectly informed about the utilities of his
opponents. Secondly, we compare our notions with previous ones in the same setting. Thirdly, still in the
same setting, we discuss stronger version of our notion applicable to non-fully rational players. Finally, we
enlarge our notions to independent players with imperfect knowledge.
Our structural theorems about our notions are proven in our appendix.
Our notions for the collusive setting will appear in the final version of this paper.
2 Our Notions for Independent Players with Perfect Knowledge
A game G has two components: a context C and a mechanism M , G = (C,M). The context describes
the players, all possible outcomes, the players’ utilities for each outcome, and the players’ knowledge (and
possibly their beliefs). The mechanism describes which strategies are available to the players (including their
opt-out strategies) and how each profile of strategies yields an outcome. Through out this paper, all our
games are finite, and thus so are the set of players, the set of all possible outcomes, and the set of strategies
for each player.
We start by clarifying the contexts of the present setting.
Definition 1. A context C with perfectly knowledgeable and independent players, a PKI context for short,
consists of the following components:
• N , the finite set of players: N = {1, . . . , n}
• Ω, the set of possible outcomes. A member ω of Ω is referred to as an outcome.
• ui, for each player i, is i’s utility function, mapping outcomes to real numbers.
All these components are common knowledge to all players.
As for the purest form of mechanism design, we insist that all knowledge lies with the players, and only
with the players. Accordingly, the designer of a mechanism for the above context knows the sets N and Ω
as usual, and knows as well that all players know the profile u of utility functions, but he himself has no
information about u. (Notice that, aiming at robustness, we have no need for players’ beliefs.)
Above, as for all contexts considered in this paper, we automatically assume that all players are indepen-
dent whenever no coalitional structure is specified. Accordingly, in any game whose context coincides with
the above C, each players i acts so as to maximizes his own ui.
Essential Notation If σ is a profile of strategies in a game G = (C,M), then H(σ) denotes the history
of σ, and M(σ) denotes the outcome of σ. If M is of normal form then H(σ) coincides with σ. If M is of
extensive form, then H(σ) consists of the sequence of decision nodes plus the terminal node of the game tree
reached when executing σ. If M or some σi’s are probabilistic, then H(σ) and M(σ) are both distributions.
Whenever we say that S is a profile of “strategy subsets”, we mean that each Si is a subset of i’s strategies.
For such an S, we define the Cartesian closure of S as S = S1 × · · · × Sn, and we define S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj .
Through out this paper, for every mechanism M , we denote by outi the opt-out strategy of player i. In
fact, every M must satisfy the following
opt-out condition: Each player i has an opt-out strategy outi such that, for all subprofile σ−i of strategies
of the other players, ui(M(outi unionsq σ−i)) = 0.2
2If M or the strategies of the other players are probabilistic, then the above utility for player i equals 0 with probability 1.
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Let us now proceed to define a notion fundamental to rational robustness.
Definition 2. (Distinguishable Strategies.) In a game G, let S be a profile of deterministic-strategy
subsets and let σi and σ′i be two different strategies for some player i. Then we say that σi and σ
′
i are
distinguishable over S if ∃τ−i ∈ S−i such that
H(σi unionsq τ−i) 6= H(σ′i unionsq τ−i).3
If this is the case, we say that τ−i distinguishes σi and σ′i over S; else, that σi and σ
′
i are equivalent over S.
Note that, in all definitions of this section, we might as well assume that σi and σ′i belong to Si. In the
proofs of our theorems, however, we shall need more generality. (Namely, we need to consider strategies σi
and σ′i that are distinguishable over S, while only one of them belongs to Si.)
Note too that, if G is of normal-form, then, as long as each Sj , for j 6= i, is non-empty, any pair of different
strategies of player i are distinguishable over S. (In fact, by definition, in a normal-form game the history of
a strategy profile σ coincides with σ itself, so that any two different strategy profiles have different histories.)
Therefore, the notion of distinguishable strategies can meaningfully come into play only for extensive-form
mechanisms. This is indeed in accordance with our prior claim that mechanisms of extensive form are ideally
suited for protecting mechanism design from the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy.
We leverage our notion of distinguishable strategies in order to bridge the currently vast gap between
strict and weak domination. (The following notion of “distinguishable domination” is again definable for all
games, but really meaningful only for games of extensive form.)
Definition 3. (Distinguishably Dominated Strategies.) Let G = (C,M) be a game, i a player, σi
and σ′i two strategies of i, and S a profile of deterministic strategy subsets. We say that σi is distinguishably
dominated (by σ′i) over S —equivalently that σ
′
i distinguishably dominates σi over S— if
1. σi and σ′i are distinguishable over S; and
2. E[ui(M(σi unionsq τ−i))] < E[ui(M(σ′i unionsq τ−i))] for all sub-profiles τ−i distinguishing σi and σ′i over S.
Notation For short,
• We refer to a distinguishably dominated strategy as a DD strategy.
• We write “σi ' σ′i over S” or “σi 'S σ′i” to denote that σi and σ′i are equivalent over S.
• We write “σi ≺ σ′i over S” or “σi ≺S σ′i” to denote that σi is DD by σ′i over S.
• We write “σi  σ′i over S” or “σi S σ′i” to denote that either σi ≺ σ′i over S or σi ' σ′i over S.
Definition 4. (Iterative Elimination of DD Strategies.) In a game G, let Σ = Σ0, . . . ,ΣK be a sequence
of profiles of deterministic-strategy subsets such that, for each k < K, there exists at least one player i such
that (a) Σk+1i is a proper subset of Σ
k
i , and (b) Σ
k+1
j is a subset of Σ
k
j for all j 6= i.
We say that Σ is an iterative elimination of DD strategies (IEDD for short) if for each player i and any
strategy σi ∈ Σki \ Σk+1i , there exists a strategy σ′i ∈ Σk+1i such that σi  σ′i over Σk.
We say that an IEDD Σ is full if, for each player i, (1) Σ0i is the set of all strategies of i in G and (2)
σi 6 σ′i over ΣK for all pairs of strateigs σi, σ′i ∈ ΣKi . If Σ = Σ1, . . . ,ΣK is a full IEDD, we refer to ΣK as
the terminal set of Σ.
The above definition allows Σk+1 to be generated from Σk by “simultaneously” eliminating multiple
strategies of multiple players. Notice that this does not generate “any problem” in the sense that , as part
of the proof of our first theorem, we show that Σk+1 can always be generated from Σk by a sequence of
elementary steps, in each of which only a single strategy is eliminated.4
3If H(σi unionsq τ−i) and H(σ′i unionsq τ−i) are distributions over the histories of G, then the inequality means that the two distributions
are different.
4In principle problems may arise in multiple ways. For instance, when a player i eliminates σi because σi ≺ σ′i over Σk and
there exists τ−i ∈ Σk−i distinguishing the two, while another player j simultaneously eliminates τj .
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Definition 5. (Rationally Robust Solutions, Strategies and Plays) In a game G, we say that a profile
S of strategy subsets is a rationally robust solution for G if there exists a full IEDD Σ = Σ0, . . . ,ΣK such that
S = ΣK .
If this is the case, we refer to each σi ∈ ΣKi as a rationally robust strategy (over Σ), and to each profile
σ ∈ ΣK as a rationally robust play (over Σ).
Definition 6. (Rationally Robust Implementation) Let C be a class of PKI contexts, P a property
over (distributions of) outcomes of contexts in C , and M an extensive-form mechanism with simultaneous
and public actions. We say that M is a rationally robust implementation of P over C if, for any C ∈ C , there
exists a rationally robust solution S for the game (C,M) such that:
1. for each player i, outi 6∈ Si; and
2. for all plays σ ∈ S, P holds for M(σ).
Recall that each mechanism must satisfy the opt-out condition, and thus each player i will not be afraid
to participate in the above game (C,M), because he always has the opportunity of playing his own opt-out
strategy outi and receive 0 utility. However, if outj were rationally robust for some player j, then M should
guarantee property P when j chooses to opt out. In an auction, depending on the property, this might be still
possible, because auction outcomes are “separable,” that is, it is possible to comply with player j choice to
opt out by assigning him no goods and ask him to pay nothing, while “running the auctions for the remaining
players. However, in general the only outcome in which a player j has zero utility when he chooses to opt out
consists of forcing the “empty outcome” (in essence to cancel the game), making it impossible to guarantee
any non-trivial property.
Requiring that no opt-out strategy is rationally robust implies that each player has a rationally robust
strategy which is “safe” for him, that is ensuring him a non-negative utility, as long as all other players choose
their rationally robust strategies. More precisely,
Proposition 1. Let S be a rationally robust solution of a game (C,M). For any player i, if outi 6∈ Si, then
there exists τi ∈ Si such that E[ui(M(τi unionsq σ−i))] ≥ 0 for each subprofile σ−i ∈ S−i.
Proof Sketch. Since S is the terminal set of a full IEDD (S0, . . . ,SK) and outi 6∈ Si, there must exists k < K
such that outi ∈ Ski but outi 6∈ Sk+1i . Accordingly, there exists τk+1i ∈ Sk+1i such that outi  τk+1i over
Ski , which implies that for any σk+1−i ∈ Sk+1−i , E[ui(M(τk+1i unionsq σk+1−i ))] ≥ 0. Thus if τk+1i ∈ Si, then setting
τi = τk+1i satisfies the proposition. Otherwise, our game being finite, we can trace the “killer” of strategy
τk+1i , the “killer of the killer”, and so on, until we reach the desired τi.
The above solution concept and implementation notion are certainly robust “in name”. Let us now argue
that they are also robust “in fact.” To this end, our first theorem guarantees that full iterated elimination
of DD strategies is order independent. That is, the terminal set of every possible full IEDD is essentially the
same: not only will each player i end up with the same number of rationally robust strategies, but all sets
of such strategies will be equivalent to one another, in the sense that they yield the same histories, and thus
the same outcomes. More formally,
Theorem 1. Let G = (C,M) be a game, and S = (S0, . . . ,SK) and T = (T 0, . . . , T L) be two full IEDDs.
Then there exists a profile φ such that
• for each player i, φi is a bijection from SKi to T Li ; and
• for any strategy profile σ ∈ SK , defining φi(σ) to be φi(σi), we have H(φ(σ)) = H(σ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 implies that if a mechanism robustly implements a property P , then, for all possible IEDDs Σ,
as long as all players choose to eliminate DD strategies in the order dictated by Σ, P will hold no matter which
profile of surviving strategies is played out. But: why should all players choose the same elimination order?
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Common knowledge of rationality is one thing, and common knowledge of elimination order a different thing
altogether. To us, a notion of implementation is robust only if it does not rely on anything beyond common
knowledge of rationality. Thus to demonstrate the robustness “in fact” of our implementation notion, we
prove that, as long as a mechanism rationally robustly implements a property P , P will hold even when each
player chooses his own full IEDD independently of all other players. More formally,
Theorem 2. Let M be a rationally robust implementation of a property P over a class of PKI contexts C , C
a context in C , and S1, . . .Sn rationally robust solutions of the game (C,M). Then ∀ plays σ ∈ S11×· · ·×Snn ,
P holds for M(σ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
3 Comparisons with Related Prior Notions
Let us compare rationally robust implementation with prior solution concepts in the current setting, that
is, independent players with perfect knowledge. To this end, we consider separately the case of normal-form
and extensive-form mechanisms, and make use of the following notation.
Notation In any game G,
• If S is a set of strategy profiles, then H(S) denotes the set of histories {H(σ) : σ ∈ S}, and
S denotes the Cartesian closure of S, that is S = S1 × · · · × Sn, where Si = {σi : σ ∈ S}.
(That is, we use the same symbol for the Cartesian closure of a profile of strategy subsets. Thus if X is
such a profile, then X = X.)
• R will consistently denote the closure of a rationally robust solution,
S the set of strategy profiles surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies,
E the set of all pure Nash equilibria, and
PE the set of all subgame-perfect equilibria (if G is of extensive form).
As noted in the second paragraph after Definition 2, in a game of normal form, any two different strategies
σi and σ′i of player i are distinguishable over any profile S of strategy subsets. Therefore σi  σ′i over S if and
only if σi ≺ σ′i over S, which itself occurs if and only if σi is strictly dominated by σ′i over S. Accordingly, any
full IEDD is a (complete) iterative elimination of strictly dominant strategies. Thus, because the later notion
is well known to be order independent and preserve all Nash equilibira, the following statement trivially
holds.
Fact 1 For normal-form games, R = S and thus R ⊃ E and R ⊃ E .
Since our notions can be defined relative to mixed strategies, analogous statements hold for such strategies.
Let us now turn our attention to extensive-form games.
Fact 2 For all extensive-form games, PE ⊂PE ⊂ R ⊂ S , and all inclusions are strict for some games.
The latter statement, of course, holds “up to equivalent strategies.” But in extensive-form games, different
strategy profiles may yield the same history. Thus a stronger and more meaningful version of the last
statement is as follows.
Fact 2′ For all extensive-form games, H(PE ) ⊂ H(PE ) ⊂ H(R) ⊂ H(S ), and all inclusions are strict
for some games.
(An example where the second inclusion is strict is given in Appendix C. All other inclusions are trivial.)
Note that Fact 2′ is absolute, that is, it no longer requires the qualification “up to equivalent strategies.”
Since in games of extensive form different histories have different outcomes, Fact 2′ also shows our notion of
implementation to be distinct from both subgame-perfect implementation and implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies.
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4 Independent Players with Perfect Knowledge but Less Rationality
Mechanism design must leverage the players’ rationality. But if we want to maximize the relevance of
implementation theory, we must be aware that in practice not all players are perfectly rational. Of course
there is little that a mechanism can achieve if the players are dumb, but we must consider a mechanism M
to be preferable to a mechanism M ′ if “it achieves the same property while requiring less rationality from
the players.”
Accordingly, in Appendix D we present a “hierarchy” of implementation notions, that starts from ratio-
nally robust implementation and requires less and less rationality.
5 Independent Players with Imperfect Knowledge
We now extend rationally robust implementation to a more realistic player model. The precise details of this
model are not crucial, but we do need a model in order to present our notion formally.
Definition 7. A context with imperfectly knowledgable and independent players (an IKI context for short)
is a quadruple C = (N,Ω, u,K) where
• N is as usual the set of players;
• Ω is as usual the set of possible outcomes;
• u is as usual the profile of utility functions; and
• K is the external knowledge profile, where each Ki is a set of utility-functions subprofiles (for the players
other than i) such that u−i ∈ Ki.
As usual, N and Ω are assumed to be common knowledge. In addition, each player i knows ui and Ki (and
no other information). We may refer to ui also as i’s internal knowledge.
Remarks
• We again prefer to assume that all knowledge lies with the players, and thus a mechanism designer
knows nothing about the profiles u and K.
• For simplicity, the contexts defined above do not include “knowledge about other players’ knowledge.”
(Such knowledge may however be properly utilized within our notions.)
• Ki, the external knowledge of player i, consists of all information that i has about the utilities of the
other players. For simplicity, we define it above as a set guaranteed to include the true utility functions of
the other players. More generally, Ki could be a distribution whose support includes u−i. More generally
yet, Ki may be a “partial” probability distribution.5 Such generality will unnecessarily complicate the
simple way in which we intend to derive our imperfect-knowledge notions from our perfect-knowledge
ones.
Intuition When the players are perfectly informed, the statements and proofs of our theorems and lemmas
in particular imply that a full IEDD can be computed by the following sequence of “big steps.” First, the
players simultaneously eliminate all their DD strategies, over the set of all possible strategies. Then, they
simultaneously eliminate all their DD strategies, over all strategies surviving the previous step. And so on,
until no strategy can be eliminated any more.
Let us now see what happens when one modifies the knowledge of the players, until we reach our desired
knowledge setting. For simplicity, we let there be just two players: Alice and Bob.
1. No External Knowledge. Assume that neither Alice nor Bob has any knowledge about the other’s
utility function. Then, the best Alice can do is to eliminate all her DD strategies, assuming the full
5That is, starting with a distribution assigning a probability p(u′−i) to each possible utility-function subprofile u
′
−i, Ki may




strategy set for Bob. In fact, in order to eliminate any strategy for Bob, she must have at least some
information about his utilities. Thus she cannot “iterate” and thus eliminate any further strategy of
hers. Symmetrically, Bob can eliminate all his DD strategies, assuming the full strategy set for Alice,
and nothing more. Although each one has acted separately, from a “global” point of view, they have
performed the first “big step” of the above IEDD.
2. Full, But Not Common, Knowledge. Now assume that each of Alice and Bob knows exactly the other’s
utilities, but that this is not common knowledge. In fact, assume that Alice knows nothing about Bob’s
knowledge, and viceversa. Then, from a global point of view, they can perform exactly the first two big
steps, but cannot eliminate any other strategy.
3. Our External Knowledge. Finally assume, as we do, that Alice has some knowledge about Bob’s utility
function, but no knowledge about Bob’s knowledge. And viceversa. Then, they will end up “between
Big Step 1 and Big Step 2. Namely, the best Alice can do is the following. First, pretending to be in
Bob’s shoes, she eliminates as many DD strategies for Bob as possible, based on her knowledge about
Bob’s utilities, over the full set of strategies for herself. (The latter restriction is necessary because,
having no knowledge about Bob’s knowledge, to be safe she must assume that Bob knows nothing about
her!) Second, she eliminates all possible strategies for her, over what is left in Bob’s strategy set.
Bob will eliminates his own strategies in a symmetric way.
That is all they can safely eliminate.
All is left is to explain what is meant by
“pretending to be in Bob’s shoes, she eliminates as many DD strategies for Bob as possible,
based on her knowledge about Bob’s utilities, over the full set of strategies for herself.”
Essentially, this means that Alice considers, one by one, all possible utility functions for Bob in her external
knowledge set KA. For each u′B ∈ KA, pretending for a moment that it is Bob’s true utility function, Alice
eliminates all of Bob’s DD strategies over her full strategy set, and thus computes the corresponding set of
surviving strategies for Bob: Su′B . Then, she computes SB, her best prediction for Bob’s “truly surviving set”,
by taking the union of all Su′B . (Notice that SB is a conservative choice, in the sense that it is guarantee to
contain all strategies for Bob after he himself eliminates all his own DD strategies!) Finally, Alice eliminates
all her own DD strategies over SB.
Let us now proceed more formally.
Definition 8. (Compatible Contexts.) We say that a context C ′ = (N ′,Ω′, u′,K ′) is compatible with
player i in a game G = (C,M) if, letting C = (N,Ω, u,K), we have N ′ = N , Ω′ = Ω, ui = u′i and Ki = K
′
i.
Thus if i is a player in a context C, then he knows nothing about C besides the set of players and the
set of outcomes, N and Ω, and his own internal and external knowledge, ui and Ki. Thus from his own
perspective, every context C ′ compatible with him is equally likely. Such a C ′ is any context whose players,
outcomes and his own utility function is as i knows them to be, and whose subprofile of utility functions for
the other players belongs to Ki.
Recall that a mechanism consists of the strategies available to the players, and of the outcome function
mapping strategy profiles to outcomes. Now assume that a designer comes up with a mechanism M for an
IKI context C. Then, because he has no information about the players internal and external knowledge, the
strategies envisaged by M can at most depend on the set of players N and the set of outcomes Ω. Following
tradition, and without ambiguity, we denote by Σ0i the set of all strategies available to i, and by Σ
0 the
corresponding profile. In particular, therefore, Σ0 will be the same for the game (C,M) as for any other
game (C ′,M) whose context C ′ is compatible with some player i ∈ N .
But if the profile Σ0 is the same for all possible compatible contexts, the same cannot be said for the
set of DD strategies over Σ0. Indeed, distinguishable domination depends on the players utilities, and the
player utilities of two contexts compatible with player i can be different for any player other than i. We must
therefore always specify the context of interest when speaking of DD strategies.
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Definition 9. (Level-1 Rationally Robust Plays) Let M be a mechanism for a set of players N and a
set of outcomes Ω. Then for any IKI context C for M ,
• We denote by Σ1C the profile of strategy subsets such that each Σ1C,i consists of all strategies in Σ0i that
are not distinguishably dominated over Σ0 in the game (C,M).
• We say that a strategy σi ∈ Σ1C,i is level-1 distinguishably dominated if there is a strategy σ′i ∈ Σ1C,i, such
that σ′i distinguishably dominates σi over Σ
1
C′ for all contexts C
′ compatible with i.
• We denote by Σ2C,i the set of all strategies in Σ1C,i that are not level-1 distinguishably dominated.
• We say that a strategy vector σ is an level-1 rationally robust play of the game (C,M) if σi ∈ Σ2C,i for all
player i.
Definition 10. (Level-1 Rationally Robust Implementation.) Let C be a class of IKI contexts, P
be a property over (distributions of) outcomes of contexts in C , and M an extensive-form mechanism with
simultaneous and public actions. We say that M level-1 rationally robustly implements P if, for all contexts
C ∈ C
1. for each player i, outi 6∈ Σ2C,i; and
2. for all level-1 rationally robust plays σ of the game (C,M), P holds for M(σ).
Above, we have extensively used the label “level-1” to emphasize how our notion depend on the fact
that the external knowledge of our players is defined only at the first level. This labeling may make it
easier for someone to extend our notions to contexts whose players have “knowledge about knowledge.” Such
generalization, however, will make our notions sufficiently heavier without —in our opinion— enhancing
enough their practical applicability.
The rationale for requiring the opt-out strategy of player i not to belong to Σ2C,i is similar to that for
rationally robust implementation. Again, this requirement implies that there exists a strategy in Σ2C,i which
ensures player i a non-negative utility, as long as each other player j chooses his strategy from Σ1C,j .
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A The Proof of Theorem 1
Definition 11. We define three binary relations among profiles of strategy subsets, the elimination relation
e→, the replacement relation r→, and the idle relation i→, as follows. Let S = ∏i Si and T = ∏i Ti be two
profiles of strategy subsets. We write
• S e→ T , if there exists a player i such that
(1) Tj = Sj for all j 6= i; and
(2) Si = Ti ∪ {σi}, where σi ∈ Si \ Ti and σi S τi for some τi ∈ Si.
• S r→ T , if there exists a player i such that
(1) Tj = Sj for all j 6= i; and
(2) Si \ Ti = {σi} and Ti \ Si = {τi}, where σi and τi are equivalent over S.
• S i→ T , if S = T .
Remark Notice that
• S e→ T if T is obtained from S by eliminating a single strategy σi such that σi S τi for some τi ∈ Si.
• S r→ T if T is obtained from S by replacing a single strategy σi with an equivalent strategy τi.
• S i→ T if T is obtained from S by “doing nothing”.
Definition 12. If, in some game G, S r→ T , then the natural bijection φ : S → T is the profile of bijections
defined as follows:
• For any player j such that Sj = Tj, φj : Sj → Tj is the identity map.
• If i is the single player such that Si \ Ti = {σi} and Ti \ Si = {τi} then φi : Si → Ti is the identity map
every where, except that φi(σi) = τi.
• For any strategy profile σ ∈ S, φ(σ) = (φ1(σ1), . . . , φn(σn)).
Lemma 1. For any game G, if S r→ T and φ is the natural bijection from S to T , then
1. T r→ S;
2. ψ, the natural bijection from T to S, equals φ−1, where φ−1 is defined to be (φ−11 , . . . , φ
−1
n ); and
3. H(φ(σ)) = H(σ) for any strategy profile σ ∈ S.
Proof. The proof is quite trivial. Indeed, let i be the single player such that Si \Ti = {σi} and Ti \Si = {τi}.
We have that τi and σi are equivalent over T also, and S is obtained from T by replacing τi with σi.
Moreover, for any strategy profile µ ∈ S, if µi 6= σi, then µ = φ(µ), and thus H(µ) = H(φ(µ)); if µi = σi,
then φ(µ) = τi unionsq µ−i, and again H(µ) = H(φ(µ)), since σi and τi are equivalent over S. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. (Interchangeability of Replacements) In any game G, if R r→ S by replacing σi with σ′i,
and S r→ T by replacing τj with τ ′j, then either
(1) i = j, σ′i = τj, and σi = τ
′
j, in which case R
i→ T (i.e., “nothing done”); or
(2) i = j, σ′i = τj, and σi 6= τ ′j, in which case R r→ T by replacing σi with τ ′j (i.e., “shortcut”); or
(3) i = j, σ′i 6= τj, and σi = τ ′j, in which case R r→ T by replacing τj with σ′i (i.e., “shortcut”); or
(4) i = j, σ′i 6= τj, and σi 6= τ ′j, in which case R r→ W by replacing τj with τ ′j, and W r→ T by replacing σi
with σ′i (i.e., “switch”).
(5) i 6= j, in which case R r→W by replacing τj with τ ′j, and W r→ T by replacing σi with σ′i (i.e., “switch”).
Proof. The proofs of (1) — (4) are absolutely trivial. The proof of (5) includes two steps.
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Step 1. We prove that R r→W by replacing τj with τ ′j .
It is easy to see that τj ∈ Rj (as Rj = Sj), and thus it suffices to show that τj 'R τ ′j , that is,
H(τj unionsq µ−j) = H(τ ′j unionsq µ−j) ∀µ−j ∈ R−j .
If µi 6= σi, then µ−j ∈ S−j also, and we immediately have H(τj unionsq µ−j) = H(τ ′j unionsq µ−j), since τj 'S τ ′j .
If µi = σi, then we have
H(τj unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}) = H(τj unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}) = H(τ ′j unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}),
where the first equality is because σi 'R σ′i, and the second is because τj 'S τ ′j . Let Dh, . . . , D0 be the
decision nodes in history H(τj unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}), from height h to height 0 respectively. We have that: (a)
Dh is the root of the decision tree; (b) for any ` such that i ∈ ND` , σi and σ′i coincide at node D`, that
is, player i chooses the same action at D` according to these two strategies; and (c) for any k such that
j ∈ NDk , τj and τ ′j coincide at node Dk. (b) and (c) are because the above two equalities respectively.
Consider the execution of τ ′j unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}. We show that Dh, . . . , D0 are the decision nodes in H(τ ′j unionsq
σi unionsq µ−{i,j}), by induction. First, the execution starts at node Dh, since this is the root of the decision
tree. Assume Dh, . . . , D` are the decision nodes in H(τ ′j unionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j}). For any player k ∈ ND
`
, if k = j,
then player k chooses his action according to τ ′j , but this is equivalent to say that he chooses his action
according to τj , by (c); if k = i, then k chooses his action according to σi; if k 6= i, j, then k chooses his
action according to µk. That is, all players in ND
`
choose the same actions as in execution τjunionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j},
and thus the decision node in height `−1 reached is execution τ ′junionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j} is D`−1. In sum, Dh, . . . , D0
are the decision nodes in H(τ ′junionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j}), which implies that H(τ ′junionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j}) = H(τjunionsqσiunionsqµ−{i,j}).
Step 2. We prove that W r→ T by replacing σi with σ′i.
Again it is easy to see that σi ∈ Wi, and thus it suffices to show that σi 'W σ′i, that is, H(σi unionsq µ−i) =
H(σ′i unionsq µ−i) ∀µ−i ∈W−i.
If µj 6= τ ′j , then the equality follows trivially.
If µj = τ ′j , then we need to show that H(σi unionsq τ ′j unionsq µ−{i,j}) = H(σ′i unionsq τ ′j unionsq µ−{i,j}). From Step 1, we have
that both two histories equal H(σi unionsq τj unionsq µ−{i,j}), and we are done.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. (Preponement of Elimination) In any game G, if R r→ S and S e→ T , then either
(1) R e→ T (i.e., “shortcut”); or
(2) there exists W such that R e→W and W r→ T (i.e., “switch”).
Proof. Let R r→ S by replacing σi with σ′i, and S e→ T by eliminating τj because τj S τ ′j .
If i = j and σ′i = τj , then R
e→ T by eliminating σi because σi R τ ′j , trivial.
If i = j and σ′i = τ
′
j , then R
e→ W by eliminating τj because τj R σi, and W r→ T by replacing σi with
σ′i, trivial.
If i = j, σ′i 6= τj , and σ′i 6= τ ′j , then R e→W by eliminating τj because τj R τ ′j , and W r→ T by replacing
σi with σ′i, trivial.
Else, i 6= j. We first show that R e→W by eliminating τj because τj R τ ′j , and then W r→ T by replacing
σi with σ′i. First, it is easy to see that τj , τ
′
j ∈ Rj , since Rj = Sj . Let µ−j be an arbitrary strategy subprofile
in R−j . If µi 6= σi, then µ−j ∈ S−j also, and thus E[uj(M(τj unionsq µ−j))] < E[uj(M(τ ′j unionsq µ−j))] whenever
H(τj unionsq µ−j) 6= H(τ ′j unionsq µ−j), since τj S τ ′j . If µi = σi, then
H(τj unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}) = H(τj unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}) and H(τ ′j unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}) = H(τ ′j unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}),
since σi 'R σ′i. Because σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j} ∈ S−j , we have that
E[uj(M(τj unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}))] < E[uj(M(τ ′j unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}))]
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whenever H(τj unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}) 6= H(τ ′j unionsq σ′i unionsq µ−{i,j}). Accordingly, we have that
E[uj(M(τj unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}))] < E[uj(M(τ ′j unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}))]
whenever H(τj unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}) 6= H(τ ′j unionsq σi unionsq µ−{i,j}). In sum, τj R τ ′j , and R e→ W by eliminating τj . The
second part (i.e., W r→ T by replacing σi with σ′i) is trivial.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1. Let G = (C,M) be a game, and S = (S0, . . . ,SK) and T = (T 0, . . . , T L) be two full IEDDs.
Then there exists a profile φ such that
• for each player i, φi is a bijection from SKi to T Li ; and
• for any strategy profile σ ∈ SK , defining φi(σ) to be φi(σi), we have H(φ(σ)) = H(σ).
Proof. The proof consists of proofs of several claims, which follow easily from the above lemmas.
Claim 1. Let the sequence S, T be an IEDD, then there exists another IEDD X0, . . . , XL such that (1)
X0 = S; (2) XL = T ; and (3) X` e→ X`+1 for all ` < L.
Proof. The proof is quite trivial. Notice that if σi S σ′i, then σi S′ σ′i for any S′ such that S′j ⊆ Sj∀j.
Therefore the strategies (even belonging to different players) eliminated simultaneously when generating T
from S can be eliminated one by one and in any order.
According to Claim 1, without loss of generality, we assume that Sk e→ Sk+1 for all k < K, and that
T ` e→ T `+1 for all ` < L, because the sequences Sk,Sk+1 and T `, T `+1 are both IEDDs. Because for each
player i, S0i and T 0i are both the set of all strategies of i in G, we have that S0 = T 0 , R, and thus the
following diagram:























Claim 2. Let R, S, and T be three profiles of strategy subsets. If R b1→ S and R b2→ T with b1, b2 ∈ {e, r, i},
























Proof. The proof consists of complicated case analysis for b1 and b2, however, each case can be verified
easily based on our lemmas. We only provide an example to show how such a case analysis looks like.
Assume that R e→ S and R r→ T . Then by Lemma 1, we have that T r→ R. By Lemma 3, we have that
either (a) T e→ S or (b) T e→W and W r→ S. For case (a), letting W = S, we have that S i→W and T e→W ;
for case (b), by Lemma 1 again, we have that S r→W , which together with T e→W gives our claim.
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Claim 3. There exist a profile of strategy subsets W and two sequence of profiles of strategy subsets X =
X0, . . . , XU and Y = Y 0, . . . , Y V such that (1) X0 = SK and XU = W ; (2) Y 0 = T L and Y V = W ; (3)
Xu
bu→ Xu+1 with bu ∈ {e, r, i} for all u < U ; and (4) Y v cv→ Y v+1 with cv ∈ {e, r, i} for all v < V . In other


















W (= XU = Y V )
Proof. This claim follows by using Claim 2 iteratively in the diagram we get in Claim 1.
Claim 4. There exist X = X0, . . . , XU and Y = Y 0, . . . , Y V satisfying Claim 3, such that bu = r for all












W (= XU = Y V )
Proof. Let X = X0, . . . , XU and Y = Y 0, . . . , Y V be the two sequences in Claim 3. We first prove that
bu 6= e∀u < U . By contradiction, assume that there exists 0 ≤ u < U such that bu = e. Consider the smallest
such u. If u = 0, then there exists two strategies σi, σ′i ∈ SKi such that σi  σ′i over SKi , contradicting the fact
that SK is the terminal set of S. If u > 0, then we find a sequence Xu−1, Xu, Xu+1 such that Xu−1 r→ Xu
and Xu e→ Xu+1. By Lemma 3, we have that either Xu−1 e→ Xu+1, or Xu−1 e→ Z and Z r→ Xu+1. No
matter which is the case, we have moved the elimination relation one step forward. Keep on doing so, we
have that SK e→ Z for some Z, again contradicting the fact that SK is the terminal set of S.
By symmetry, we have that cv 6= e∀v < V . By omitting all idle relations (if exist) in the two sequences,
we find two new sequences which still satisfy Claim 3 but contain only the replacement relation.
Let X = X0, . . . , XU and Y = Y 0, . . . , Y V be the two sequences in Claim 4. According to the first property
in Lemma 1, we have that Y v+1 r→ Y v for any v < V . Therefore there exists a sequence Z = Z0, . . . , ZU+V
such that Z0 = SK , ZU+V = T L, Zs r→ Zs+1 for all s < U + V . Indeed, Zs = Xs for all s ≤ U , and
Zs = Y U+V−s for all s ≥ U . Accordingly, we have the following diagram:
SK(= Z0) r //___ T L(= ZU+V )
For each s < U+V , let φs be the natural bijection from Zs to Zs+1. Let φ = φU+V−1◦· · ·◦φ0 , (φ1, . . . , φn),
where the composition of two profiles ψ and ξ, denoted by ξ ◦ ψ, is defined to be (ξ1 ◦ ψ1, . . . , ξn ◦ ψn). It
is easy to see that each φi is a bijection from SKi to T Li . It is also easy to see that by Lemma 1, for any
σ ∈ SK , we have that
H(φ(σ)) = H((φU+V−1 ◦ φU+V−2 ◦ · · · ◦ φ0)(σ)) = H((φU+V−2 ◦ · · · ◦ φ0)(σ)) = · · · = H(φ0(σ)) = H(σ).
Q.E.D.
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B The Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let M be a rationally robust implementation of a property P over a class of PKI contexts C , C
a context in C , and S1, . . .Sn rationally robust solutions of the game (C,M). Then ∀ plays σ ∈ S11×· · ·×Snn ,
P holds for M(σ).
Proof. By definition of rationally robust implementation, there exists a rationally robust solution S0 of the
game (C,M), such that for all strategy profiles τ ∈∏i S0i , P holds for M(τ).
As shown by the proof of Theorem 1, for each 0 ≤ k < n, there exists a sequence Zk = Zk,0, . . . ,Zk,`k
such that (1) Zk,0 = Sk, (2) Zk,`k = Sk+1, and (3) Zk,c r→ Zk,c+1 for each 0 ≤ c < `k. In other words, we
have the following diagram:
S0(= Z0,0) r // Z0,1 r //___ S1(= Z0,`0 = Z1,0) r //___ Sn(= Zn−1,`n−1)
Moreover, for each 0 ≤ k < n, there exists a profile of bijections φk : Sk → Sk+1. Indeed, φk = φk,`k−1 ◦ · · · ◦
φk,0, where φk,c is the natural bijection from Zk,c to Zk,c+1, for each 0 ≤ c < `k.
Accordingly, for each σ ∈ S11 × · · · × Snn , there exists a strategy profile τ ∈ S0 such that for each player
i, σi = φi−1i ◦ · · · ◦ φ0i (τi). Indeed, each τi can be found by taking the inverse of the bijections φi−1i , . . . , φ0i
consecutively. Notice that P holds for M(τ). Therefore it suffices to show that H(σ) = H(τ).
According to Lemma 1 (and as in the proof of Theorem 1), it suffices to show that there exists a sequence
X 0, . . . ,XK such that: (1) X 0 = S0, and (2) X k r→ X k+1 for each k < K, and ψ(τ) = σ ∈ XK , where
ψ = ψK−1 ◦ · · · ◦ ψ0, and ψk is the natural bijection from X k to X k+1.
Without loss of generality, assume that σi 6= τi for each player i. It suffices to show that there exists a
sequence X = X 0, . . . ,X n such that: (1) X 0 = S0, and (2) for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, X k−1 r→ X k by replacing τk
with σk.
We do so by construct the sequence X explicitly. First of all, let X 0 = S0. Since τ1 ∈ S01 = Z0,0,
σ1 ∈ S11 = Z0,`0 , and σ1 = φ01(τ1), there must exist a step 0 < c ≤ `0 such that: (a) σ1 ∈ Z0,c1 , (b)
σ1 = φ
0,c−1
1 (µ1) for some µ1 ∈ Z0,c−1, and (c) µ1 is the image of τ1 under the sequence of bijections
φ0,01 , . . . , φ
0,c−2
1 (or µ1 = τ1 if c = 1). Consider the smallest such c. If c = 1, then let X 1 = Z0,1 and we
are done. Otherwise, we have found a sub-sequence Z0,c−2,Z0,c−1,Z0,c such that Z0,c−2 r→ Z0,c−1, and that
Z0,c−1 r→ Z0,c by replacing µ1 with σ1. According to Lemma 2 (2), (4), and (5), there exists W 0,c−1 such
that Z0,c−2 r→ W 0,c−1 by replacing some strategy ν1 with σ1, and either W 0,c−1 r→ Z0,c or W 0,c−1 i→ Z0,c.
In other words, we have moved the place where σ1 appears one step forward in the sequence from S0 to S1,
while keeping the head and the tail unchanged. Keep on doing so, we find a new sequence (perhaps shorter
than Z0) W 0,0 = S0, . . . ,W 0,c−1,Z0,c, . . . ,Z0,`0 = S1 such that W 0,0 r→ W 0,1 by replacing τ1 with σ1. Let
X 1 = W 0,1, we are done. By a similar procedure, we move the place where σ2 appears forward, so that it
appears one step after X 1, and we have found X 2. In sum, the elements in sequence X can be constructed
one by one. Given such a sequence, letting ψ be the corresponding bijection from X 0 to X n, we have that
σi = ψi(τi) for each i, and thus H(σ) = H(ψ(τ)) = H(τ), which implies P holds for M(σ).
Q.E.D.
C “Proof” of Fact 2′
Recall from Section 3:
Fact 2′ For all extensive-form games, H(PE ) ⊂ H(PE ) ⊂ H(R) ⊂ H(S ), and all inclusions are strict
for some games.
It is easy to see that the first and third inclusions can be strict. Here we construct a game G where the
second inclusion is strict, that is, H(PE ) ( H(R). Game G includes 3 players: P1, P2, and P3. They act
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sequentially and each acts only once. The players strategies are listed on the edges of the game tree, and



















































1, 3, 2 4, 1, 2 2, 2, 1 2, 4, 1
It is easy to see that the closure of all sub-game perfect equilibria isPE = {B}×{C,D}×{EG,EH,FG,FH}.
In particular, the history {A,C, F} is not in H(PE ). However, no strategy (of anybody) is distinguish-
ably dominated, and no two strategies are equivalent, over the profile of strategy subsets of G. Therefore
R = {A,B} × {C,D} × {EG,EH,FG,FH}, and clearly the history {A,C, F} is in H(R).
D A Stronger Notion of Implementation for Less Rational Players
Computing a full IEDD in an extensive-form mechanism (as said, the most suitable form of mechanisms
for tackling collusion, complexity, and privacy problems) may require lots of iterations and force the players
to always keep a global view of the whole game tree. Indeed, rationally robust implementation (as well as
any other notions of implementation based on iterative elimination) may require quite a deal of rationality!
However, once the game is almost over and a player i is about to take the last action in the game, we are
in safer ground to assume that he will be able to analyze the rest of the game and choose his action in a
rational manner.
Accordingly, we would be very happy if a mechanism M guarantees its desired property P as long as the
players act rationally in just the last step of the game. Indeed, this requires less rationality than assuming
that the players are able to analyze the whole game. The “next best” arises when M guarantees P as soon
as the players act sufficiently rationally in the last two steps of the game. And so on.
Because we are interested in capturing not fully rational players, when we move towards the root of the
game tree, from height k to height k + 1, we do not demand that the larger subgame be totally analyzed.
Demanding so would imply that the players must “revisit” games of height k and thus demanding a lot of
rationality. Indeed, we are interested in capturing an elementary, single-pass, bottom-up analysis, so that
after processing the whole game, some DD strategies will still be left.
It is actually important to realize that (1) full iterative elimination of DD strategies, (2) the above sketched
elimination process, and (3) backward induction are all distinct processes.6
Before presenting our stronger notions, let us develop a suitable notation for the class of mechanisms we
focus on.
D.1 Extensive-Form Mechanisms With Simultaneous and Public Actions
Definition 13. We say that mechanism M is of extensive-form with simultaneous and public actions if it
satisfies the following criteria. As for any extensive-form mechanism, M specifies a a game tree T , whose
internal nodes are decision nodes and whose leafs are terminal nodes. As usual too, each terminal node is
associated with an outcome ω in Ω, or a distribution over Ω. For each decision node D our mechanism
6Indeed, the third notion is as prone to equilibrium selection as plain Nash-equilibrium implementation. Only when the
Cartesian closure of set S of subgame-perfect equilibria equals the set S itself is backward induction robust against equilibrium
selection.
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specifies a set of players acting at D, as well as a set of available actions for each player acting at D. Each
action becomes common knowledge as soon as it is played by one of the acting players.7
In dealing with such a mechanism M we make use of the following notation.
• Tree Height. The height of a node in T is taken to be the number of edges in the longest path from the
node to a leaf. (Thus a leaf has eight 0). The height of a tree is the height of its root.
• Actors and Actions. We denote by ND the set of players acting at a decision node D, and by ADi the
set of available actions for each player i ∈ ND. Accordingly, the entire subprofile of action sets at node
D is denoted by AD.
• Subgames and Substrategies. Together with a context C, M not only specifies a game G, but also a
subgame for each subtree of T . For each decision node D, we denote by GD the subgame rooted at D.
and by σDi the restriction of σi to subgame G
D. (Thus, σDi specifies which action i chooses among all
those available to him for each node of the subtree in which he acts.) By Given a restricted strategy
profile σD for GD, the outcome of M obtained by executing σD is denoted by M(σD).
D.2 Backward Robustness
Rather than eliminating all his DD strategies, our next notion only requires that a player is able to eliminate
some of his strategies, by processing the game tree in a natural, bottom-up fashion.
Recall that a refinement of a game G is game coinciding with G, except that each player i has available
only a subset of his original strategies.
Definition 14. (Backward-Robust Solutions) Let G = (C,M) be a game, where C is a perfect-knowledge
context and M an extensive-form mechanism, with simultaneous and public actions. Then the Backward-
Robust solution of G is defined to consist of all strategy profiles of G, the refinement of G computed as
follows:
• At each decision node D of height 1, the players in ND refine their strategy sets in GD by iteratively
eliminating all their strictly dominated strategies in GD.
G˜D denotes the so computed refinement of GD, and G|1 the refinement of G obtained by substituting,
for each decision node D of height 1, subgame GD with game G˜D.
• For h = 2 to t, the height of G’s game tree, compute the refinement G|h of G|h−1 as follows:
For each decision node D of height h, the players in ND compute the refinement G˜D of G|h−1D by
iteratively eliminating all their strictly dominated strategies in G|h−1D.
G|h is then the game obtained by substituting, for each decision node D of height h, subgame G|h−1D
with game G˜D.
Game G is then defined to be game G|t.
Remarks
• Notice that, when a decision node D has height 1, then iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies coincides with “iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.” We emphasize, however
that when D’s height is h > 1, for computing G˜D, the players in ND do not iteratively eliminate their
strictly dominated actions in the action set AD, but their strictly dominated strategies in the whole
game G|h−1D.
7We refrain from using the more standard term “perfect-information” to avoid confusion, as we use the term “perfect-
knowledge” to refer to a context where the players’ utilities are common knowledge to all players.
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• Also notice that G is a rationally robust refinement of G in the sense that strategy profiles in G do not
depend on the players’ beliefs, but only on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
• Finally notice that G could be further refined by additional “bottom-up passes.” Assume that, when
refining G|h+1D, a player i’s strategy σi is eliminated. Then σi is of the form (a, σ′i) where a is an action
of i at node D and σ′i is a strategy of i in some subgame G˜
D′ of height h. Accordingly, eliminating σi
implies eliminating σ′i from game G˜
D′ . However, eliminating σ′i may cause a strategy τ
′
j of player j in
G˜D
′
to become strictly dominated. Yet, since the subgames of height h have already been processed,
such τ ′j will continue to exist in G
D′ . This would not be a “problem” if D′ were not reachable in G. But
if it were, then G could actually be further refined by another bottom-up process. Indeed, G is not a
rationally robust solution of G.
Definition 15. (Backward-Robust Implementation) Let C be a class of perfect-knowledge contexts, let
P be a property over (distributions of) outcomes of contexts in C , and let M be an extensive-form mechanism
with simultaneous and public actions. We say that M is a backward-robust implementation of P (over C )
if, for any C ∈ C ,
1. for each player i, outi 6∈ Σi where Σi is the set of strategies for player i in the backward-robust solution
G of G = (C,M); and
2. for any profile of strategies σ in G, P holds for M(σ).
In essence, in a backward robust implementation, the players can work less but the mechanism must work
more, in the sense that it must guarantee its desired property at a set of strategy profiles which includes a
rationally robust solution. (Indeed, “the weaker the solution concept, the stronger the implementation!”)
Let us now prove some crucial properties of our stronger notion of implementation. The first is that it
implies rationally robust implementation.
Theorem 3. (Backward-Robust Implementations are Rationally Robust) Let C be a class of perfect-
knowledge contexts, let P be a property over (distributions of) outcomes of contexts in C , and let M be an
extensive-form mechanism with simultaneous and public actions. If M is a backward-robust implementation
of P over C , then M is also a backward-robust implementation of P over C .
Proof. Let C be a context in C , and G = (C,M) the corresponding game. Let G|0 = G, and let Σk be
the profile of strategy subsets of G|k, for 0 ≤ k ≤ t, with t the height of G’s game tree. It is easy to see
that for each k < t, each node D of height k + 1, and each player i, if a strategy σDi in subgame G|k
D
is (iteratively) strictly dominated and thus eliminated, then all strategies τi of i in G|k with τDi = σDi are
(iteratively) distinguishably dominated and can be eliminated simultaneously. Accordingly, there exists an
IEDD X 0, . . . ,XLk such that X 0 = Σk and XLk = Σk+1. Connecting all these IEDD’s, we have an IEDD
Y0, . . . ,YL such that Y0 = Σ0 and YL = Σt. Because M backward robustly implements P , P holds for
M(σ) for all strategy profiles σ ∈ YL. Keeping on eliminating DD strategies from YL until nothing can be
eliminated, we get a full IEDD Y0, . . . ,YK , with K ≥ L. Since YKi ⊆ YLi for every player i, we have that P
holds for M(τ) for every τ ∈ YK . Therefore M is a rationally robust implementation of P over C .
Q.E.D.
Another property is that our second notion of implementation is indeed strictly stronger than our first
one. Namely,
Theorem 4. There exist games G such that H(G) ) H(R).
Proof. We construct such a game G explicitly. It includes 2 players, P1 and P2. The game tree is of height
2. At each decision node, each player has two actions available (e.g., {a, b} for P1 and {α, β} for P2), and
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they act simultaneously. At each terminal node, the players utilities are listed, with P1 comes first, as shown
below.



























































2, 1 1, 2 1, 2 4, 1 4, 1 3, 2 3, 2 4, 1
According to backward robust implementation: At height 1, no strategy can be eliminated from the two
sub-games. At height 2, there are two strictly dominated strategies for P1, namely, ace (by bce) and acf
(by bcf). After eliminating these two strategies, nothing can be eliminated any more. In particular, there
are two backward robust strategies (of P1 and P2 respectively), ade and αδ, yielding history {(a, α), (d, δ)}.
Namely, {(a, α), (d, δ)} ∈ H(G).
According to rationally robust implementation: In the first step, the same two strategies ace and acf
of P1 are eliminated (they are strictly dominated, and thus distinguishable dominated) as above. In the
second step, based on remaining strategies, there are two DD strategies for P2, namely αδ (by αγ) and
αδφ (by αγφ), and they are eliminated. Notice that once these two strategies of P2 are eliminated, we can
conclude that the history {(a, α), (d, δ)} is not in H(R), without even finishing the full IEDD. Accordingly,
H(G) ) H(R).
Q.E.D.
We stress that backward robust implementation is indeed possible. In fact, some of our robust mechanisms
guarantee their desired properties under this stronger notion.
Let us point out that one could consider even stronger notions of implementation, requiring even less
rationality from the players. In particular, we consider mechanisms that, for each height h, guarantee a desired
property Ph for any profile of strategies in G|h. Of course, the smaller h, the stronger the implementation
notion, because
H(G|1) ⊃ H(G|2) ⊃ · · · ⊃ H(G|t) = H(G) ⊃ H(R)
where it is easy for the inclusions to be strict. Of course too, however, a rationality-quality tradeoff should
be expected. That is, we interpret the fact that a property P could be guaranteed with lesser rationality as
an indication that a stronger property P ′ could be guaranteed by a rationally robust implementation.
21

